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Notice
ANY TAX ADVICE IN THIS COMMUNICATION IS NOT 
INTENDED OR WRITTEN BY KPMG TO BE USED, AND 
CANNOT BE USED, BY A CLIENT OR ANY OTHER PERSON 
OR ENTITY FOR THE PURPOSE OF (i) AVOIDING 
PENALTIES THAT MAY BE IMPOSED ON ANY TAXPAYER 
OR (ii) PROMOTING, MARKETING OR RECOMMENDING TO 
ANOTHER PARTY ANY MATTERS ADDRESSED HEREIN. 
You (and your employees, representatives, or agents) may disclose to any and all 
persons, without limitation, the tax treatment or tax structure, or both, of any 
transaction described in the associated materials we provide to you, including, but 
not limited to, any tax opinions, memoranda, or other tax analyses contained in 
those materials.
The information contained herein is of a general nature and based on authorities 
that are subject to change.  Applicability of the information to specific situations 
should be determined through consultation with your tax adviser. 
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Dated Material
THE MATERIAL CONTAINED IN THESE COURSE MATERIALS 
IS CURRENT AS OF THE DATE PRODUCED. THE MATERIALS 
HAVE NOT BEEN AND WILL NOT BE UPDATED TO 
INCORPORATE ANY TECHNICAL CHANGES TO THE 
CONTENT OR TO REFLECT ANY MODIFICATIONS TO A TAX 
SERVICE OFFERED SINCE THE PRODUCTION DATE. YOU 
ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR VERIFYING WHETHER OR NOT 
THERE HAVE BEEN ANY TECHNICAL CHANGES SINCE THE 
PRODUCTION DATE AND WHETHER OR NOT THE FIRM 
STILL APPROVES ANY TAX SERVICES OFFERED FOR 
PRESENTATION TO CLIENTS. YOU SHOULD CONSULT WITH 
WASHINGTON NATIONAL TAX AND RISK MANAGEMENT-
TAX AS PART OF YOUR DUE DILIGENCE.
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Agenda
 The Post Election Lineup
 The Fiscal Cliff
− Unsustainable budget deficits
 Tax Reform--What Is/Was/Will Be on the Table?
 What are the “Stakes” 
− Individual 
− Business
 Rate/Base
 International
 Pass-throughs/ C. Corps
 Timing and Potential Outcomes
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The Election Outcome
 President
 Senate
− Democrats increase their majority—55 (including 2 
Independents)- 45
 House
− Republicans retain control
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CBO Statutory Baseline 
(-2.2 trillion over 10 
years)
CBO Alternative Fiscal 
Scenario (-10 trillion over 
10 years)
2012
Sources: CBO, Budget and Economic Outlook, fiscal years 2012 to 2022 (August 2012), Table 1.6; 
CBO alternative fiscal scenario assumes extension of doc fix, increase in discretionary spending at the 
rate of inflation, no enforcement of budget caps, extension of expiring tax provisions, and index AMT 
for inflation, as well as the extra interest costs associated with each.
2016
The Fiscal Cliff --Total Budget Deficit – Total Dollars
2020
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The Fiscal Cliff At The End of 2012
 All 2001-2003 tax cuts expire
 AMT “patch” expires
 “Extenders” have expired 
 Payroll tax cut expires
 Many unemployment benefits expire
 “Doc fix” expires
 Sequestration takes effect in FY13
 Debt ceiling may be reached
7
© 2012 KPMG LLP, a Delaware limited liability partnership and the U.S. member firm of the KPMG network of independent member firms affiliated with 
KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”), a Swiss entity. All rights reserved. Printed in the U.S.A. 
The Fiscal Cliff--Factors That Will Affect the Outcome
 Fiscal situation is daunting
− Delicate balance between encouraging economic 
recovery and controlling long-term deficit
 CBO projections illustrate dilemma
• Current law (expiration of tax cuts, failure to patch AMT, etc.) 
results in slow short term economic growth, long term fiscal stability
» Short term GDP decline of .5%, unemployment  at 9.1% through 
4th Q. 2013, public debt at 58% of GDP in 2022
• Extension of tax cuts accelerates growth, creates unsustainable 
long term deficits
» Short term GDP increase of 1.7%, unemployment  at 8% 
through 4th Q. 2013, public debt at 90% of GDP in 2022
Source: CBO, Budget and Economic Outlook; Fiscal Years 2012 to 2022 (August 2012)
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The Fiscal Cliff--Factors that Will Affect the Outcome
 Individual tax issue must be addressed
− Only significant difference between the parties is 
whether tax rates increase on high income individuals
 Who are high income individuals
 What happens to dividend rates
− Fate of extenders
 Family and Business Tax Cut Act of 2012 reported by Senate 
Finance Committee 
• Major “extenders” retroactively renewed through 2013
• $205 billion revenue cost is not offset
• Not likely to move as a separate bill
• Bonus depreciation not extended
 Sequestration must be addressed
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What Is Was and Will Be on the Table?
 President’s FY 13 Budget
− Individual 
− Business/ The President’s Framework for  Business Tax 
Reform
 The Path to Prosperity (House 2012 Budget 
Resolution)
 Camp/Enzi Corporate Rate Reduction/Territorial 
Proposals
 Fiscal Responsibility Commission (Simpson-Bowles)
 Debt Reduction Task Force (Domenici-Rivlin)
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President’s FY2013 Budget - Major Individual Proposals
 Sunset Bush Tax Cuts for Those With Incomes in 
Excess of $250,000
− Reinstate Pease and PEP
 Limit value of itemized deductions to 28 percent
 Restore 2009 wealth transfer tax parameters
− Require consistency in value for transfer and income 
taxes
− Modify rules on valuation discounts
− Require a minimum term for GRATs
− Limit duration of GST exemption
− Coordinate income and transfer tax rules applicable to 
grantor trusts
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President’s FY13 Budget - Business Taxation
The President’s Framework for Business Tax Reform
− Has to be read in conjunction with the Budget
− Twenty-eight % marginal rate
 Effective rate of 25% for manufacturing income
 Retain and expand the R & E credit
− Rejection of pure territorial tax system for non-U.S. 
income
 Imposition of minimum tax on  foreign income
− Eliminate accelerated depreciation
− Limit corporate interest deductibility
− Expand scope of corporate tax
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FY 2013 Budget - Major Domestic Business Tax 
Proposals
 Extend “expensing” for one year
 Provide one year 10% credit for new jobs and wage increases
 Provide a 20% tax credit for expenses attributable to insourcing a U.S. 
trade or business
 Disallow deductions for expenses attributable to outsourcing a U.S. trade 
or business
 Modify the section 199 manufacturing deduction
− Eliminate the deduction for fossil fuel production
− Increase deduction to 18% for “advanced technology property”
− Increase general deduction to achieve at tax rate of 25% on manufacturing 
income
 Expand and make R&E credit permanent
 Extend certain expiring provisions through 2012
 Repeal LIFO and LCM method of accounting for inventories
− Ten year transition for LIFO, 4 for LCM
 Tax carried interests as ordinary income
 Repeal oil and gas and coal  (fossil-fuel) preferences
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FY 2013 Budget - Major International Tax Proposals
 Minimum tax on foreign income
 Defer deduction of interest expense related to deferred 
foreign-source income
 Determine foreign tax credit on a pooled basis
 Tax currently “excess” returns associated with transfers of 
intangibles to a related CFC subject to a low foreign 
effective tax rate
 Clarify the definition of intangible property to include 
workforce in place, goodwill and going concern value for 
transfer pricing and section 367(d) purposes
 Modify the tax rules for dual capacity taxpayers to limit tax 
credit to host country generally applicable income tax rate
 Limit earnings stripped by expatriated entities
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The Principal Components of the Camp Discussion Draft 
and Enzi Bill
 Maximum corporate rate of 25 percent
 Exemption of 95 percent of dividends attributable to active business 
conducted by a 10 percent owned corporate subsidiary
− Treatment of 10/50 companies
− Treatment of branches
− Expenses allocable to exempt income
 Sale of CFC stock
 Subpart F income
− Active financing income
 Base erosion alternatives
− Excess returns from transferred intangibles
− Low-taxed cross border foreign income treated as Subpart F income
− Foreign intangible income treated as Subpart F income but taxed at 
preferential rate
− Deduction for foreign income derived from a trade or business in the U.S.
 Thin capitalization/interest allocation
 Repatriation
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Fiscal Responsibility Commission
 Individual Taxes (Illustrative Proposal)
− Three brackets—12/22/28
− Repeal AMT, Pease and PEP
− Capital gains and dividends taxed at ordinary rates
− Maintain current law (or an equivalent) for the EITC and Child Tax Credit
− 12 percent non-refundable tax credit for mortgage interest on mortgages 
below $500,000
− Cap and then phase out employer provided health insurance
− 12 percent non-refundable tax credit for charitable contributions in excess 
of 2 percent of AGI
− Eliminate exclusion for newly issued state and municipal bonds
− Consolidate and cap retirement accounts
− Eliminate all other income tax expenditures
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Fiscal Responsibility Commission
 Business Taxes
− One Bracket- 28%
− Eliminate
 Domestic Production Credit
 LIFO
 General Business Credits
 “Other” tax expenditures
− Foreign source income
 Active Income taxed on territorial basis
 Current law for passive income
• No VAT
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The Debt Reduction Task Force
 Major Individual Tax Recommendations
− Two brackets—17/27 percent
− Capital gains and dividends taxed as ordinary income
− Reform EITC
− 15 percent refundable credit for mortgage interest and charitable 
deductions
− Eliminate deduction for state and local taxes
− 15 percent refundable tax credit for retirement savings contributions up to 
lesser of 20 percent of earnings or $20,000
− Include 100 percent of Social Security benefits in income with 15 percent 
tax credit of individual’s social security benefits plus a credit equal to 15 
percent of the standard deduction
− Allow deduction of miscellaneous itemized deductions in excess of 5 
percent of AGI
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Debt Reduction Task Force
 Corporate Tax
− Corporate rate of 27%
− No territorial tax
− Eliminate tax expenditures
 Establish a 6.5% VAT
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The Stakes in Reforming Individual Taxation
 What are the goals?
− Revenue neutrality?
− Distributional neutrality?
 What is the debate about?
− Rates
− Base
− Distribution
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The Stakes In Reforming Business Taxation 
 Revenue
− FY12- $251b., 10% of total federal revenue
 “Competitiveness”
− Standard of living v. multinational competitiveness“
 The goal of any reform of our international tax system should be 
to advance the [national] welfare of the United States.”  John M. 
Samuels, “American Tax Isolationism,” Tax Notes, June 29, 
2009
 Revenue neutrality is generally accepted as best 
possible outcome for business
Source: Joint Committee on Taxation Memorandum, October 27, 2011
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The Stakes In Reforming Business Taxation – cont’d
 Rate v. Base
− Base broadening/rate reduction
 Winners and losers 
• Domestics v. multinationals
• Manufacturing v. other sectors
• “C” Corporations v. pass-throughs
 JCT has estimated 28% revenue neutral rate based on the elimination 
of domestic tax preferences applicable to corporations only
• Rate could go lower if the tax preferences claimed by pass-through 
entities were also eliminated
 Administration 28% rate depends on using international reforms plus 
additional revenue sources
• Expand corporate tax to include “large” pass-through entities
• Limit C corporation interest deductibility (“thin capitalization” rules)
Source: Joint Committee on Taxation Memorandum, October 27, 2011
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Worldwide Effective Tax Rate
RATE Coalition vs. WIN America Campaign
Source: Martin Sullivan Calculations 134 Tax Notes 1486 (March 19, 2012)
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Joint Committee Very Preliminary Estimate of Revenue Lost by Reducing 
the Corporate Rate to 28 Percent and the Revenue Gained by Repealing 
Certain Tax Expenditures for All Business Income - 2012-2021
Reduction in corporate rate to 28  % -717.5 b
Interaction with corporate rate change -243.0 b
Revenue Gain of Selected Tax Expenditures
U.S. manufacturing deduction 163.9 b
Research and experimentation credit 160.2 b
LIFO and LCM 72.6 b
Accelerated cost recovery 724.1 b
Oil and gas and fossil fuel production incentives 24.2 b
Low income housing credit 6.0 b
Municipal bond interest exclusion 34.8 b
Like kind exchanges 18.2 b
Source:  Joint Committee on Taxation Memorandum, October 27, 2011
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The Stakes n Reforming Business Taxation---cont’d
 Rate v. Base cont’d
− Other “base broadeners” come into play
 Changes to accounting rules
 Changes to other cost recovery rules
 Limitations on the use of operating loss and tax credit carryovers
 Limitations on the use of acquired tax losses and carryovers
 Taxation of non-U.S. source income
− All multinationals lose if international preferences may be used to reduce overall 
rate (Obama)
− Some win and some lose if non-U.S. source income rules are revised on a revenue 
neutral basis (Camp/Enzi)
 Pass-Throughs v. Corps
− 70 percent of U.S. business income is earned by pass-throughs
− Elimination of business tax preferences results in a tax increase for this sector
− Creating parity is difficult
 No consensus in the business community
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Timing and Potential Outcomes
 The Effect of the Election
 The comparison to 1986
− Treasury Studies
− Executive leadership
 Timing
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How to Think About
Real Tax Reform
By Harry L. Gutman
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The country faces a perilous fiscal situation.
Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke has described
the end of this year as a ‘‘fiscal cliff.’’ The 2001 and
2003 tax cuts and the annual alternative minimum
tax patch expire. So do the 2 percentage point
payroll tax cut, many unemployment benefits, the
Medicare reimbursement ‘‘doc fix,’’ and several
other temporary tax provisions that are extended
perennially. Sequestration mandated by last sum-
mer’s Budget Control Act will become effective for
fiscal 2013 and the existing national debt limit may
have been reached. The Congressional Budget Of-
fice released a paper in May addressing the eco-
nomic effects of reducing the fiscal restraint that is
scheduled to occur in 2013.1 It concluded that if all
the scheduled tax increases and spending decreases
actually occurred, the economy ‘‘would probably be
judged to be in recession.’’2
Balancing short-term economic recovery needs
with long-term deficit reduction is a daunting task.
Too much fiscal contraction can jeopardize eco-
nomic recovery. Failure to address the long-term
issues will put the country on an unsustainable
fiscal track. Those are problems a lame-duck Con-
gress must address.
Douglas Elmendorf, head of the CBO, said re-
cently that increasing tax revenues by one-sixth or
reducing entitlement spending by one-fourth could,
if done separately, put the country on a sustainable
fiscal path.3 But anyone who has tried to quantify
precisely what it would take to achieve those objec-
tives understands the practical and political im-
probability of that outcome. Consequently, the
consensus of most objective observers is that rev-
enues need to increase and spending, particularly
entitlement spending, must be reduced.4 This report
is about revenues.
1CBO, ‘‘Economic Effects of Reducing the Fiscal Restraint
That Is Scheduled to Occur in 2013’’ (May 2012), Doc 2012-11046,
2012 TNT 100-32.
2Id. at 2.
3Douglas Elmendorf, ‘‘Back to the Classroom: A Visit to
Harvard University,’’ CBO (Feb. 24, 2012), available at http://
www.cbo.gov/publication/43017.
4See, e.g., testimony of former Sen. Pete Domenici and Dr.
Alice Rivlin before the Senate Finance Committee (June 19,
2012), Doc 2012-13104, 2012 TNT 119-38.
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I. Introduction
The recently published Hamilton Project report,
‘‘A Dozen Economic Facts About Tax Reform,’’
stated in its introduction that ‘‘today’s tax reform
debates are often based on misconceptions.’’5 That
is an understatement. As my former employer Sen.
Pat Moynihan was fond of saying, ‘‘Everyone is
entitled to his own opinion, but not to his own
facts.’’6 The purpose of this report is to expose some
of those misconceptions and provide some basic
facts and tools to help reach an informed opinion
about the real trade-offs and appropriate outcomes
affecting the role taxes should play in mitigating the
daunting fiscal challenge.7
The first section will provide a macro context,
reviewing briefly the most recent CBO budget fore-
casts, comparing the tax burden in the United States
with that of the other OECD countries, and finally
looking at the revenue sources in all the OECD
countries. The next section will describe the policy
objectives of any tax regime: equity, efficiency, and
administrability. It will compare two fundamental
tax bases: income and consumption. Next, it will
define and discuss the tax expenditure concept,
which provides a framework from which to analyze
both the extent to which government spending is
accomplished through the tax system and the ben-
efits and deficiencies of using the tax system in that
way. The next two sections will comment on the
taxation of business income and the wealth transfer
tax. The final section will describe the practical
constraints on legislative action. The specific con-
gressional procedural rules that govern the consid-
eration of tax legislation, as well as the need for
executive leadership, will be addressed.
The discussion will assume that because of the
budget situation any tax changes will have to be
revenue neutral at a minimum. In other words, any
tax reductions will have to be offset by equivalent
tax increases. Thus, the tax reform world will re-
semble a poker game, which is revenue neutral
because a finite amount of money comes to the
game and the same amount leaves, but in different
pockets. The real question is who will pay.
II. Macro Data
The CBO budget projections provide the eco-
nomic context for this discussion. They are the pro-
jections that govern congressional consideration of
tax and spending legislation. Figure 1 shows the
CBO projection of the deficit based on two different
sets of assumptions. The upper line represents the
CBO projections determined under the baseline it is
required to use under the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (Budget Act).8
5Hamilton Project, ‘‘A Dozen Economic Facts About Tax
Reform’’ (May 2012).
6Id.
7See also S. Douglas Hopkins, ‘‘Factual Distortions Derail
Productive Debate on Tax Reform,’’ Tax Notes, June 18, 2012, p.
1517, Doc 2012-11567, or 2012 TNT 119-7. 8P.L. 93-344.
Figure 1. Total Budget Deficit — Total Dollars
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That baseline is, in substance, current law.9 Recog-
nizing that is not likely to occur, the CBO has created
an alternative fiscal scenario, under which all the
expiring tax cuts are extended, spending caps are not
enforced, the doc fix is renewed, and other technical
changes assumed.10 That is the lower line on the
chart — a cumulative $11 trillion deficit over the next
10 years. The CBO has described the latter fiscal path
as unsustainable. Under it, public debt rises to 93.2
percent of GDP by 2022. It is also important to note,
while not shown on the figure, that federal tax rev-
enues are currently at about 15 percent of GDP, well
below the recent historical average of approximately
18 percent.11
Figure 2 is a terrific Moynihan document. It
shows total tax revenue by types as a percentage of
GDP in the OECD countries.12 The United States is
ranked 31st out of 34. Some may think that is the
right place, but the U.S. tax burden is actually well
below that of the other OECD countries.
Figure 3 shows the specific tax sources of the
OECD countries by percentage of GDP in 2008.13
The United States is about the same in income taxes,
lower in Social Security taxes (to be expected be-
cause of the more extensive social safety nets in
many of the OECD countries), and not even close in
consumption taxes. In fact, the United States is the
only country out of 163 surveyed that does not have
a national consumption tax.
While that anticipates the end of the story, you do
not have to be too clever to connect the dots of a
fiscal dilemma, relatively low taxation, and an
untapped revenue source.
III. Tax System Design
When policymakers confront the question of
what a tax system should look like they focus on
three criteria: equity, efficiency, and administrabil-
ity. Equity reflects judgments as to the appropriate
distribution of the tax burden. Efficiency means that
9CBO, ‘‘The 2012 Long-Term Budget Outlook,’’ at 2 (June
2012), Doc 2012-12113, 2012 TNT 109-23.
10Id. at 3.
11Id. at 78.
12OECD, ‘‘Revenue Statistics 1965-2010,’’ Table 2, at 82 (2011),
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1707/883932508699. 13Id.
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the system should be neutral regarding decision-
making. Administrability means that the system
should impose the least possible compliance and
administrative costs. Our existing system is a dis-
grace when measured against each of those criteria.
A. Equity
The appropriate distribution of the tax burden is
a subjective decision to be made by our elected
representatives. We would see more sensible out-
comes if politicians made some effort to understand
it rather than mouthing platitudes that score politi-
cal points but are demonstrably wrong.
We start with the falsehood du jour — ‘‘only 46
percent of American households pay federal tax.’’
Forty-six percent is an estimate by the Brookings-
Urban Institute Tax Policy Center, but it represents
households that did not have income tax liability in
2011.14 Moreover, the number is anomalous because
incomes were depressed in 2011 and two temporary
tax cuts that were enacted in the American Recov-
ery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 removed many
from the tax rolls. In 2007, before the economic
downturn, 60 percent of households paid income
taxes.15
A more accurate measure would take into ac-
count the payroll tax. When that is done, the
number of households paying federal tax was 83
percent in 2009 and 86 percent in 2007.16 Most of
those who pay no federal tax are elderly, disabled,
students, or unemployed.
Finally, those numbers do not take state and local
taxes into account. Recent data show that in 2011
the bottom fifth of households paid 12.3 percent of
their incomes in state and local taxes.17 When all
taxes are taken into account, the bottom one-fifth of
households pay an average of 16 percent of their
incomes in taxes.18 That is quite a different distri-
butional picture from that suggested by some
‘‘scholars’’ and television commentators — as well
as some unnamed senators who surely know better.
One other word about the distribution of federal
income tax liability: Over the last 50 years, tax rates
for the wealthiest 1 percent of Americans have
declined 40 percent while tax rates for the rest of the
population have remained roughly the same.19
Since 1979, earnings for that top 1 percent have
risen 250 percent.20 Those who have received the
largest income gains have also seen the largest tax
cuts, thus materially reducing the overall progres-
sivity of the income tax. So, while it is true that the
share of taxes paid by the top 1 percent has in-
creased, it is because their share of income has also
increased. The top 1 percent of Americans paid 28
percent of federal income tax revenues in 2007
(compared with 15.4 percent in 1979).21 That
group’s share of income was 19.4 of total U.S.
income in 2007 as compared with 9.3 percent in
1979.22 Overall, a distribution of federal income
taxes across all households for 2011 would show
mild progressivity, with the effective tax rate as a
percentage of gross income on the highest quintile
at 14.9 percent.23 The rate for the top 1 percent was
20.3 — and for the top 0.1 percent it was 19.8.24
Whether that distribution is equitable is a social
judgment. But that judgment should be based on a
comprehensive analysis of the tax burden and not
isolated segments.
14Chuck Marr and Chye-Ching Huang, ‘‘Misconceptions and
Realities About Who Pays Taxes,’’ Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities (Apr. 11, 2012), Doc 2012-7669, 2012 TNT 71-33.
15Id.
16Tax Policy Center, ‘‘Tax Units With Zero or Negative Tax
Liability, Current Law, 2004-2011,’’ T11-0173 (June 14, 2011), Doc
2011-13102, 2011 TNT 116-43.
17Marr and Huang, supra note 14.
18Id.
19Michael Greenstone and Adam Looney, ‘‘Just How Pro-
gressive Is the U.S. Tax Code?’’ The Hamilton Project (Apr. 13,
2012), Doc 2012-7934, 2012 TNT 73-60.
20Id.
21Id.
22Id.
23Tax Policy Center, ‘‘Average Effective Federal Tax Rates by
Cash Income Percentiles, 2011; Baseline: Current Law,’’ T12-0018
(Feb. 8, 2012), Doc 2012-2600, 2012 TNT 27-34.
24Id.
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B. Efficiency
Now we turn to economics and economists. To be
sure, economists can add value to this debate, but
remember — they would say that the way to open
a can on a deserted island is to assume a can opener.
They would also tell you that a person who fought
in the Civil War and one who paid $300 to have
someone fight for him had an equivalent experi-
ence. The point is that economic theory does not
always produce the optimal societal result when
evaluated against experience, intuition, and com-
mon sense.
The ideal tax system is neutral as to its economic
effects. Our system fails that test. It is a hybrid
system that contains some elements of a consump-
tion tax, particularly our treatment of retirement
savings, and some elements of an income tax. It
affects economic behavior and is used as a substi-
tute delivery mechanism for a multitude of govern-
ment programs ranging from low-income support
to subsidies for specific activities. As a consequence,
it is an administrative and compliance nightmare.
The conceptual starting point is to identify the
tax base. As a practical matter there are two choices:
income or consumption, and they are related
(I = C + S). Thus, the income tax base includes
consumption plus savings. The consumption tax
base equals income minus savings. A different way
of expressing that relationship is to say that a
consumption tax exempts from the tax base the
normal return on an investment, a formulation
familiar to finance experts as the ‘‘immediate
deduction-yield exemption equivalence.’’25 For
many economists, that fact — the exemption of the
normal return from invested capital from the tax
base — is a fundamental reason to prefer consump-
tion rather than income as the tax base. From an
efficiency perspective, the consumption tax re-
moves the tax wedge from investment decisions
and creates a more level decision-making field.
However, that is where efficiency as a goal col-
lides with equity considerations. Another way of
looking at a consumption tax is to observe that a
consumption tax is paid only by wage earners and
those who aren’t saving. The latter group is those
who borrow heavily — perhaps students with high
debt burdens — and more importantly, those who
are consuming their savings — retirees. One can
question the fairness of a tax system whose burden
is borne by students, wage earners, and retirees.
And there is nothing secret about it — all one need
to do is look at the simple tax form that would be
filed under Dick Armey’s ‘‘flat’’ tax.26 There is no
category for interest, dividends, and capital gain. It
is hard to believe that the American public would
accept that distribution of the tax burden, unless it
was accompanied by some form of tax on capital.
There is nothing magic about a flat tax. The term
simply describes a system in which a single rate is
imposed on a specified tax base. The real question is
what the base should be. The Forbes/Armey tax
base was consumption. Take that observation one
step further: If that is a good tax, so is a VAT
because the base of both is consumption — they are
just collected differently. One suspects that the
attraction of the Forbes/Armey flat tax is that it is
advertised as a replacement for the income tax and
the VAT is viewed as an add-on tax. That may be
true as a political matter, but it cannot obscure the
fact that the taxes are economically identical.
No matter which tax base is chosen, all theorists
agree that as an efficiency matter the tax should
include the entire base. The bases of our income
taxes are far from comprehensive. That has serious
equity and economic consequences, most of which
have not been empirically quantified.
So how to think about that? The term ‘‘tax
expenditure’’ is the tool we will use. In the 1960s
Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Stanley
Surrey was searching for a term to describe the
provisions in the tax code that were not necessary to
define income. The purpose of the exercise was to
identify them — not to make a judgment about their
merit — so that they could be subjected to a
traditional cost-benefit analysis.27
Tax expenditures were defined as ‘‘revenue
losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax
laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption or
deduction from gross income or which provide a
special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral
of tax liability.’’28 For example, the home mortgage
interest deduction is a tax expenditure. Why? An
income tax does not permit the deduction of ex-
penses that produce nontaxed income. Home mort-
gage interest is an expense related to exempt
income — the imputed rental value of the home it
finances. Thus, it is a tax expenditure. Now, turn it
around and analyze the deduction as a government
spending program. It is available only to those who
own their homes, not to those who rent. Thus, it
encourages homeownership. But it is available only
to homeowners who itemize their deductions —
only 30 percent of the taxpayers who pay income
25See Michael J. Graetz, ‘‘Implementing a Progressive Con-
sumption Tax,’’ 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1575, 1598-1600 (1979).
26Senate Budget Committee hearing on income tax reform, at
291 (Feb. 22, 1995).
27See generally Stanley Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform (1976).
28Budget Act, section 3(3).
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tax.29 Finally, the value of the deduction increases as
the taxpayer’s tax bracket increases. When trans-
lated into a government program to subsidize hous-
ing, it is a program that is available only to a limited
number of homeowners, and the wealthier they are,
the bigger the benefit. If it were a direct spending
program to encourage homeownership, is that how
Congress would design it?
That example illustrates an important point
about tax expenditures that provide deductions or
exclusions from income: They are worth more the
higher a beneficiary’s tax bracket. That may be how
some spending programs would be designed, but
not many.
The tax expenditure concept has become virtu-
ally universally accepted, not necessarily by name
but by the recognition that those provisions are the
source of disguised spending and distortions in the
tax base. The Joint Committee on Taxation and the
Office of Management and Budget are required by
the Budget Act to publish a list of tax expenditures
annually.30 The list published in 1972 contained 62
items.31 Today’s list has more than 280.32
The total static revenue loss attributable to tax
expenditures in 2011 was $1.3 trillion (compared
with $63.2 billion in 1972).33 The entire federal
direct expenditure budget in 2011 was $3.6 trillion.34
In other words, 26 percent of federal spending last
year was accomplished through the tax code. And
different tax expenditures affect different groups.
The earned income tax credit, child tax credit, and
dependent care credit principally benefit the bottom
40 percent; retirement savings incentives the top 20
percent; and capital gains and dividend preferences
the top 1 percent.35
Significant spending reductions (and increased
revenues) could occur through the repeal or reduc-
tion of those tax expenditures. And that is how most
tax reformers want to finance rate reduction. But we
must be clear about how much can realistically be
accomplished by that form of base broadening. The
largest individual tax expenditures are retirement
savings incentives, the exclusion for employer-
provided health insurance, the deduction for state
and local taxes, the home mortgage interest deduc-
tion, the charitable contribution deduction, and the
step-up in basis at death. Apart from the political
constituency that supports each of those items, one
must recognize that many of them are spending
programs that cannot simply be cut off without real
economic consequences. The notion that tax reduc-
tions can be funded by eliminating many of them is
naive.36 However, they could be redesigned to
provide benefits in a more rational way; for ex-
ample, turning them into refundable credits that
phase out as incomes rise37 or, as the Obama
administration has proposed, limiting the tax ben-
efit to 28 percent.
C. Administrability
There is universal recognition that the complex-
ity of the tax code has led to a system that is almost
impossible to administer efficiently. The call for
simplification is universal — until specifics are put
on the table, and then consensus disappears. IRS
funding is being decreased while Congress is enact-
ing more spending programs for the Service to
administer, and when international tax minimiza-
tion is becoming increasingly prevalent. It should
be obvious that unless and until the tax structure is
streamlined, an administrable system is a pipe
dream.
IV. Business Taxation
Virtually no day passes without some mention in
the business press about business tax reform. The
president’s ‘‘Framework for Business Tax Reform’’
described the problem succinctly and accurately:
The United States has a relatively narrow
corporate tax base compared to other coun-
tries — a tax base reduced by loopholes, tax
expenditures and tax planning. This is com-
bined with a statutory corporate rate that will
soon be the highest among advanced coun-
tries. As a result of this combination of a
relatively narrow tax base and a high statutory
rate, the U.S. tax system is uncompetitive and
inefficient. The system distorts choices such as
where to produce, what to invest in, how to
finance a business, and what business form to
use. And it does too little to encourage job
creation and investment in the United States
while allowing firms to benefit from incentives
to locate production and shift profits overseas.
29Benjamin H. Harris and Daniel Baneman, ‘‘Who Itemizes
Deductions?’’ Tax Notes, Jan. 17, 2011, p. 345.
30Budget Act, section 3(3).
31See Surrey, supra note 27, at 8.
32JCT, ‘‘Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal
Years 2011-2015,’’ JCS-1-12 (Jan. 17, 2012), Doc 2012-894, 2012
TNT 11-21.
33Donald Marron, ‘‘How Big Are Tax Preferences? Try 1.3
Trillion,’’ available at http://www.csmonitor.com/business/tax-
vox/2012/0409/How-big-are-tax-preferences-Try-1.3-trillion.
34CBO, ‘‘The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years
2012 to 2022,’’ at xii (Jan. 2012), Doc 2012-1855, 2012 TNT 21-26.
35Hamilton Project, supra note 5, at 15.
36See, e.g., John L. Buckley, ‘‘Tax Expenditure Reform: Some
Common Misconceptions,’’ Tax Notes, July 18, 2011, p. 255, Doc
2011-13056, or 2011 TNT 138-6.
37See, e.g., Bipartisan Policy Center, ‘‘The Debt Reduction
Task Force, Restoring America’s Future’’ (Nov. 2010), Doc 2010-
24611, 2010 TNT 222-29.
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The system is also too complicated — espe-
cially for small businesses.38
Like the personal income tax, resolution of those
problems cannot occur in a vacuum. The same fiscal
challenges dictate that any responsible reformation
of business taxation must be revenue neutral, at a
minimum. Moreover, that more than 70 percent of
net business income in the United States is earned
by entities that are not subject to the corporate tax
adds another complication to the equation.39 The
latter makes it clear that reform of business taxation
cannot logically occur without a concurrent exami-
nation of individual taxation.
To date, the business tax reform discussion has
been long on rhetoric and short on detail. That is not
surprising. In the zero-sum game that is created by
budget constraints, the expressed goals may be
unattainable without an additional revenue source,
specifically a national consumption tax. Discussion
of that alternative by those who would have to
enact it is viewed as political suicide. Hence, we
have mostly aspirational objectives articulated by
the administration, the chairs of the House Ways
and Means and Budget committees, the president’s
National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and
Reform (the Bowles-Simpson commission), and the
report of the Debt Reduction Task Force, commis-
sioned by the Bipartisan Policy Center. However,
without detailed, comprehensive proposals, one is
left to speculate about the impact of change on any
of the shortcomings described above.
A. The Proposals
1. The framework. The administration has outlined
a business tax reform plan that would reduce the
corporate tax rate from 35 to 28 percent. The rev-
enue cost of that rate reduction would be offset by
repeal or substantial modification of several tax
preferences and incentives, as well as several more
fundamental changes in the taxation of business
income. The framework must be read in conjunc-
tion with the budget proposals described in greater
detail in Treasury’s ‘‘General Explanations of the
Administration’s Fiscal Year 2013 Revenue Propos-
als,’’40 which are discussed below. (An asterisk
indicates an item is included in the General Expla-
nation.) The latter document provides additional
detail to several of the proposals mentioned in the
framework.
The major aspects of the framework would:
• reduce the highest corporate rate to 28 percent;
• increase the domestic production deduction to
10.7 percent, thereby providing a 25 percent
maximum rate for domestic manufacturing
income, with an 18 percent deduction for in-
come attributable to advanced technology
property, paid for by excluding income from
oil and gas and other fossil fuel production and
some other non-manufacturing activities from
the domestic production deduction;
• make the research and experimentation tax
credit permanent and increase the rate of the
alternative simplified research credit from 14 to
17 percent;
• make permanent and refundable the tax credit
for renewable energy generation*41 and
broaden the tax base by eliminating dozens of
tax expenditures, such as:
• last-in, first-out inventory accounting, with
a 10-year transition*;
• oil and gas and fossil fuel production pref-
erences*; and
• special depreciation rules for noncommer-
cial aircraft*;
• impose a minimum tax on offshore income
earned by subsidiaries of U.S. corporations;
• deny deductions for expenses attributable to
moving operations abroad;
• tax the excess profits associated with intan-
gibles that have been transferred to low-tax
jurisdictions*; and
• deny deductions for interest attributable to
overseas investment until the related income is
taxed in the United States.*
The framework implicitly acknowledges that the
enactment of the foregoing proposals would not be
revenue neutral. It suggests three other items to
address the revenue shortfall:
• end accelerated deprecation;
• limit the deductibility of corporate interest;
and
• establish greater parity in the tax treatment of
large corporations and large passthrough enti-
ties through either expanding the reach of the
corporate tax or integrating the corporate and
individual taxes.*42
2. The administration’s fiscal 2013 revenue pro-
posals.43 Most commentary has focused on the
framework since its release. However, as part of the
38The White House and Treasury, ‘‘The President’s Frame-
work for Business Tax Reform,’’ at 1 (Feb. 22, 2012), Doc
2012-3711, 2012 TNT 36-18 (the framework).
39Id. at 7.
40Treasury, ‘‘General Explanations of the Administration’s
Fiscal Year 2013 Revenue Proposals’’ (Feb. 2012), Doc 2012-2947,
2012 TNT 30-32 (the General Explanation).
41This differs from the budget proposal in which the credit
was extended only for property placed in service in 2013. Id. at
35.
42The latter would result in a revenue loss that would have
to be offset in other ways.
43See generally the General Explanation, supra note 40.
COMMENTARY / SPECIAL REPORT
TAX NOTES, August 6, 2012 701
(C) Tax Analysts 2012. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
fiscal 2013 budget, the administration made more
than 125 specific revenue proposals to provide
incentives for job creation and growth, tax cuts for
families, initiatives to provide regional growth,
reduction of the tax gap, and structural simplifica-
tion that reach well beyond the taxation of corpo-
rate income.
The major proposals in addition to those men-
tioned in the framework include:
• extending the Bush-era individual tax provi-
sions for those with incomes below $250,000,
and reinstate the 36 and 39.6 percent rates and
the Pease overall limitation on the ability to
claim itemized deductions and the personal
exemption phaseout for upper-income tax-
payers;
• taxing qualified dividends as ordinary income;
• taxing long-term capital gains at a 20 percent
rate for upper-income taxpayers;
• limiting the value of itemized deductions and
specified above-the-line deductions and exclu-
sions to 28 percent;
• restoring the wealth transfer tax to its 2009
levels with a maximum rate of 45 percent, a
$3.5 million exclusion for estate and
generation-skipping transfer taxes, and a $1
million exclusion for gift taxes;
• extending the 100 percent depreciation deduc-
tion through 2012;
• extending other expired provisions, such as the
subpart F active financing income exception
and the controlled foreign corporation ‘‘look-
through’’ rule through 2012;
• providing a temporary 10 percent incremental
new jobs and wage credit for 2012;
• providing a suite of tax benefits for energy-
conserving expenditures;
• determining the foreign tax credit on a pooling
basis;
• modifying the tax rules for some dual-capacity
taxpayers;
• imposing a financial crisis responsibility fee of
17 basis points of covered liabilities;
• repealing lower of cost or market inventory
accounting with a four-year transition; and
• clarifying the worker classification rules.
3. The ‘Buffett rule.’44 The administration has also
proposed a 30 percent minimum tax on households
with more than $1 million of income. Treasury
Secretary Timothy Geithner has said that the ‘‘Buf-
fett rule’’ would replace the AMT. A bill that incor-
porates the concept has been introduced by Sen.
Sheldon Whitehouse, D-R.I.45 The JCT has scored
the bill as raising $46.7 billion over 10 years, far
short of the amount needed to fund a repeal of the
AMT.46 The Senate has rejected attempts to bring
the legislation up for consideration.
4. The path to prosperity (the ‘Ryan budget’).47 The
House has adopted the budget proposals of the
Budget Committee. The budget calls for a maxi-
mum corporate rate of 25 percent, broadening ‘‘the
tax base to maintain revenue growth at a level
consistent with current tax policy’’ and shifting to a
territorial system for taxing income earned outside
the United States.48 The budget offers no practical
guidance because it fails to quantify its revenue
growth target and does not indicate how the base
should be broadened to attain that goal.
5. The Camp and Enzi proposals.49 Ways and
Means Committee Chair Dave Camp, R-Mich., has
released a detailed proposal that proposes a partici-
pation exemption (territorial) system to address the
treatment of business income earned outside the
United States. He also would reduce the corporate
tax rate to 25 percent. The committee summary
states that the goal would be achieved on a revenue-
neutral basis by broadening the corporate tax base.
However, specific base-broadening provisions are
not included in the draft.
The principal elements of the Camp draft are:
• a maximum corporate rate of 25 percent;
• exemption of 95 percent of dividends attribut-
able to active business received by a 10 percent
U.S. corporate shareholder from a CFC;
• treatment of branches as corporations;
• current taxation of highly mobile passive in-
come;
• the alternative proposals to address base ero-
sion;
• interest allocation rules; and
• taxation at 5.25 percent of all existing foreign
earnings held offshore.
The Enzi bill is similar. The principal differences
are for the base erosion alterative, the treatment of
branches, the interest allocation provision, and the
44The National Economic Council, ‘‘The Buffett Rule: A Basic
Principle of Tax Fairness’’ (Apr. 2012), Doc 2012-7488, 2012 TNT
70-27.
45S. 2059, Paying a Fair Share Act of 2012.
46JCT, Revenue Estimate, Mar. 20, 2012, Doc 2012-5868, 2012
TNT 55-30.
47Paul Ryan, ‘‘The Path to Prosperity: A Blueprint for Ameri-
can Renewal, Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Resolution’’ (Mar. 20,
2012), Doc 2012-5826, 2012 TNT 55-22.
48Id.
49Camp, Summary of Ways and Means Discussion Draft
(Oct. 26, 2011), Doc 2011-22575, 2011 TNT 208-29; S. 2091, the U.S.
Job Creation and International Tax Reform Act of 2012, Doc
2012-2804, 2012 TNT 29-54; Technical Explanation of the United
States Job Creation and International Tax Reform Act of 2012
(Feb. 9, 2012), Doc 2012-2828, 2012 TNT 29-53.
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taxation of unrepatriated offshore earnings. Regard-
ing the last, the bill would allow a 70 percent
deduction for actual and electively deemed repa-
triations of offshore earnings.
6. The Cantor bill.50 The Small Business Tax Cut
Act, which has passed the House, would provide a
one-year 20 percent deduction of ‘‘qualified busi-
ness income’’ earned by entities with less than 500
employees, subject to a limit of half the wages to
employees. The JCT has estimated the cost of the
bill to be $46 billion and has commented that its
effects on the economy would be ‘‘so small as to be
incalculable.’’51
7. The National Commission on Fiscal Respon-
sibility and Reform.52 The presidentially appointed
Bowles-Simpson commission recommended the fol-
lowing:
• a single corporate tax rate between 23 and 29
percent;
• elimination of all business tax expenditures;
• adoption of a territorial system for active
foreign-source business income; and
• current taxation of foreign-source passive in-
come.
8. The Debt Reduction Task Force.53 The Debt
Reduction Task Force, co-chaired by former Sen.
Pete Domenici and Dr. Alice Rivlin, was created by
the Bipartisan Policy Center, founded in 2007 by
former Senate Majority Leaders Howard Baker, Bob
Dole, Tom Daschle, and George Mitchell. Its No-
vember 2010 report recommended:
• a two-bracket corporate rate structure of 15
and 27 percent;
• elimination of many business tax expenditures;
• retention of accelerated methods of cost recov-
ery;
• retention of current system of taxing foreign-
source income; and
• a 6.5 percent deficit reduction sales tax (VAT).
V. The Unanswered Questions
While consistent in some respects, there are sig-
nificant differences among the proposals. That lack
of specificity raises several important questions,
which can be grouped into three broad categories:
the corporate rate and base, the taxation of foreign-
source income, and the interaction of corporate and
individual taxes.
A. The Corporate Rate and Base
Reduction of the corporate rate is very important.
It will make the United States more attractive for
foreign investment and will reduce incentives to
move income offshore. All the proposals espouse a
reduction of the corporate tax rate to between 25
and 29 percent. All the proposals also assume an
outcome that is at least revenue neutral. The unan-
swered question is how they get there.
As noted earlier, the administration has proposed
several specific base broadeners in both the frame-
work and its budget. The administration would use
revenue from its proposed international reforms to
offset the cost of rate reductions and making the
expanded research credit permanent. The addi-
tional benefit to domestic manufacturing is de-
signed to be revenue neutral, with the revenue
offset coming from the elimination of the deduction
for non-manufacturing activity.
The administration has not provided any rev-
enue estimate of the total cost of rate reduction and
a permanent research credit. However, one can
roughly estimate the cost by referring to two
sources: the JCT very preliminary revenue table of
October 27, 2011, provided to Ways and Means
ranking minority member Sander M. Levin,
D-Mich.,54 and the JCT estimate of the cost of
making the research credit permanent.55 According
to the JCT, a reduction of the corporate rate to 28
percent would cost $717.5 billion over 10 years, and
interactions would reduce revenues by an addi-
tional $243 billion, for a total cost of $960.5 billion
(or roughly $137 billion per point). The JCT has
estimated the cost of research and experimentation
permanence to be $99.3 billion. Thus, the total
amount needed from base broadening is $1.06 tril-
lion.
The enactment of all the base broadeners in the
administration’s budget would not come close to
raising that amount. Indeed, according to the JCT,
enacting all the suggested business base broadeners
would raise roughly $287 billion.56 Thus, the ques-
tion is how much could be raised by enacting all or
some of the additional revenue proposals that ap-
peared in the framework: repealing accelerated cost
recovery, limiting interest deductibility, expanding
the corporate tax base to include large passthrough
50H.R. 9, the Small Business Tax Cut Act.
51H.R. Rep. 112-428, at 18 and 20.
52The National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and
Reform, ‘‘The Moment of Truth’’ (Dec. 2010), Doc 2010-25486,
2010 TNT 231-35.
53See supra note 37.
54JCT, ‘‘Estimated Revenue Effects of Corporate Tax Reform
Revenue Raising Provisions That Repeal or Modify Tax Ex-
penditures,’’ tables 11-1 133 and 11-1 134 (Oct. 27, 2011), Doc
2011-23034, 2011 TNT 213-12.
55JCT, ‘‘Estimated Budget Effects of the Revenue Provisions
Contained in the President’s Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Proposals,’’
JCX-27-12 (Mar. 14, 2012), Doc 2012-5410, 2012 TNT 51-13.
56Id.
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entities, and imposing a minimum tax on foreign-
source income. According to the JCT estimate pro-
vided to Levin, repeal of accelerated cost recovery
for all businesses (which is a timing issue) would
raise $724 billion over 10 years.57 The administra-
tion has provided no details or numbers for the
other three items, but they could certainly be de-
signed in a way that would raise the amount
needed to close the gap.
The explanation of Camp’s proposal states that
‘‘the rate reduction [to 25 percent] would be accom-
plished without increasing the deficit by broaden-
ing the tax base.’’58 Moreover, his reforms to the
international tax sector are intended to be revenue
neutral on their own: ‘‘Domestic base broadening
should [not] be used to finance international tax
relief, and vice versa.’’59 Thus, for Camp, the crucial
threshold is which domestic business tax prefer-
ences are to be eliminated to finance a rate reduc-
tion to 25 percent.
The JCT analysis indicates that repeal of all the
domestic business tax preferences that are attribut-
able to corporations (including the manufacturing
deduction, the research and experimentation credit,
and accelerated cost recovery) could pay for a rate
reduction to 28 percent.60 Additional repeal of the
business tax preferences used by noncorporate tax-
payers would raise an additional $300 billion, thus
permitting a rate reduction to approximately 25.8
percent.61 Likely transition relief is not reflected in
the estimate, nor is expected taxpayer behavioral
response taken into account in all cases.
The foregoing demonstrates that it is mathemati-
cally possible to offset a rate reduction to close to 25
percent — and there are many dials that can be
adjusted to get there. However, mathematical pos-
sibility and political possibility are two entirely
different animals. It is not likely that all the el-
ements of the administration’s plan would be en-
acted, nor is it likely that all business tax
expenditures would be eliminated for all business
taxpayers to fund the Camp proposal — and even if
they were, undoubtedly there would be transition
relief that would reduce the revenue that could be
realized. The point is that short of repealing the
laws of arithmetic, corporate rates cannot be re-
duced to the levels discussed by the politicians
simply by reducing or eliminating business tax
preferences.
It is, of course, possible to finance a corporate
rate reduction by increasing the tax rate on divi-
dends and capital gains. Energy taxes or a financial
transactions tax also could be used.
It is interesting that other countries have used
increased income taxes on high-income individuals
(as well as VATs) to fund corporate rate cuts.
Indeed, the Debt Reduction Task Force recom-
mended a 6.5 percent VAT. It is possible to amelio-
rate the fiscal crisis by allowing the Bush tax cuts to
expire, even if that is postponed for a year or two
until the economic recovery is secure. However,
that will not provide revenues to reduce the corpo-
rate tax rate if revenue neutrality is the baseline.
Some would question the likelihood of the enact-
ment of a VAT if Congress is unable to take the
easier political step of simply letting the existing tax
cuts expire to address the fiscal situation. Nonethe-
less, it is difficult to see how the reduced corporate
rate objective can be reached without it or another
revenue source.
B. The Taxation of Foreign-Source Income
The appropriate way to tax business income
earned outside the United States is a particular
point of contention. In theory, there are two polar
ways to tax offshore business income attributable to
a U.S. enterprise. The first is to tax it all currently at
the U.S. corporate rate (the worldwide system) with
a tax credit for foreign taxes to eliminate double
taxation. The second is to allow the source country
to tax the income and permit the income to be
returned to the United States without the payment
of any U.S. tax (the territorial system). Under the
former system, foreign taxes below the U.S. rate are
irrelevant. In the latter, there is a U.S. tax advantage
to having foreign income sourced to a low-tax
jurisdiction. The current U.S. system is a hybrid of
the two. Some passive income is taxed currently at
the U.S. rate; the U.S. tax on most active business
income is deferred until the income is repatriated to
the United States.
The current system has been widely criticized on
three grounds. The first is the lockout effect. Defer-
ral creates an incentive for U.S. companies to keep
active business earnings offshore, and it is esti-
mated that unrepatriated foreign earnings amount
to at least $1.4 trillion.62 The second is the alleged
base erosion that occurs as U.S.-based multinational
companies transfer highly mobile, highly profitable
57See JCT tables 11-1 133 and 11-1 134, supra note 54.
58Ways and Means discussion draft summary, supra note 49.
59Id.
60JCT Table 11-1 134, supra note 54.
61JCT Table 11-1 133, supra note 54.
62Laura D’Andrea Tyson et al., ‘‘The Benefits for the U.S.
Economy of a Temporary Tax Reduction on the Repatriation of
Foreign Subsidiary Earnings,’’ available at http://newamer
ica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/brg_repatriatio
n_tax_paper.pdf.
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intangible assets to low-tax jurisdictions. The third
is the complexity of the law.
U.S.-based multinational companies, pointing to
the fact that most other developed countries have
moved to a form of territorial taxation, advocate the
adoption of a similar system in the United States.
They cite an inability to compete effectively in the
foreign jurisdictions as one reason for change. The
other is to eliminate the lockout effect that the
current system has for foreign earnings.
Others assert that the territorial system by defi-
nition provides an incentive for U.S. companies to
locate active businesses outside the United States,
thus promoting domestic job loss. Their answer is to
move the United States closer to an effective world-
wide system by eliminating or sharply reducing
deferral. There is no lockout in a world in which all
offshore income is subject to U.S. tax immediately.
Moreover, they state that the appropriate way to
view U.S. competitiveness is to examine how a
particular policy affects the domestic standard of
living.Thus,competitivenessargumentsof themulti-
nationals must be analyzed by measuring whether
the benefit to the U.S. economy of a multinational’s
ability to compete in a foreign jurisdiction compen-
sates for the loss of domestic economic activity that
is encouraged by a territorial system.
The polar positions regarding the optimal inter-
national tax regime are reflected in the administra-
tion’s proposals on one side and the Camp
proposals on the other. The dichotomy is also seen
in the contrasting proposals of the Bowles-Simpson
and Domenici-Rivlin task forces.
C. Interactive Corporate and Individual Tax
The interaction of the corporate and individual
taxes produces the thorniest problem in the busi-
ness tax reform debate, and one that has yet to be
fully recognized and explored. If a reduction in the
corporate rate is financed by a reduction or elimi-
nation of business tax expenditures for all business
income, the result is a tax increase for those who
earn business income in passthrough form. That
appears to be a political non-starter, but it is the
only way to finance a corporate rate reduction to
approximately 25 percent by simply reducing busi-
ness tax preferences.
The inextricable connection between the corpo-
rate and individual tax leads to one further obser-
vation. If individual rates are higher than corporate
rates, there is an incentive to use corporations to
shelter income. That is not a new phenomenon.
Many code provisions attempted to address that
problem: the accumulated earnings tax, the per-
sonal holding company tax, and the provisions
regarding collapsible corporations.
Virtually all tax commentators, regardless of their
political persuasion, agree that the two-tier corpo-
rate tax is a ‘‘bad’’ tax. Because corporate income is
taxed at the corporate level and then again when
distributed, it encourages business activity to be
undertaken in passthrough form. Because interest
payments are deductible and dividend distribu-
tions are not, the tax encourages debt rather than
equity financing. The commentators agree that the
two-tier corporate tax should be eliminated and
that business income should be taxed once — and
only once — no matter the entity in which the
income is earned. That is called integration, and
there have been several studies proposing various
ways to implement it.63 Indeed, in 2003 the Bush
administration proposed a form of integration: a
dividend exclusion.64 The proposal was opposed by
many major corporations, perhaps because of a
desire to control the expenditure of retained earn-
ings. Dividend relief would encourage the distribu-
tion of those earnings.
Implementing an integration system is difficult
under the best circumstances. The revenue lost by
eliminating double tax would have to be offset. As
a starting point, that should be done in a way that
does not alter the distributional burden associated
with the existing tax. In other words, if we knew
who actually bears the economic burden of the
corporate tax we could repeal it and explicitly
increase the tax on those taxpayers. For example, if
the burden of the corporate tax was borne by
shareholders, dividend and capital gains could be
increased, altering the distribution of the tax. On the
other hand, if the burden is borne principally by
labor, a VAT could come close to being distribution-
ally neutral. The problem is that we do not know
the answer to that question. Moreover, even if we
did, replacing an implicit tax with an explicit one is
a difficult political exercise — particularly without
strong public support. As a result, it does not
appear that the correct solution is on the horizon,
leaving us with ad hoc solutions that will create
many planning opportunities and enforcement dif-
ficulties.
D. Lack of Business Consensus
The business community is by no means united
on tax reform objectives. While it is safe to assume
that all corporate taxpayers would like to see the
nominal corporate rate reduced, the requirement of
63Treasury, ‘‘Report on Integration of the Individual and
Corporate Tax Systems’’ (Jan. 1992); Graetz and Alvin C. War-
ren, Integration of the U.S. Corporate and Individual Income Taxes:
The Treasury Department and American Law Institute Reports, Tax
Analysts, 1998.
64Treasury, ‘‘General Explanations of the Administration’s
Fiscal Year 2004 Revenue Proposals,’’ at 11 (Feb. 2003), Doc
2003-3041, 2003 TNT 23-11.
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revenue neutrality introduces discord. It is no secret
that while the U.S. corporate rate is 35 percent, there
are many corporations with effective tax rates well
below that number.65 For any company, the ques-
tion will be whether business tax reform results in a
higher effective tax rate. The answer will depend on
how the corporate rate reduction is financed. There
are four potential areas of conflict: the structure of
international tax reform, domestic companies ver-
sus multinationals, capital-intensive domestic cor-
porations versus other domestic corporations, and
passthrough entities versus C corporations.
1. The structure of international tax reform. Multi-
national companies have two goals: a territorial tax
system and tax relief for the repatriation of offshore
earnings. Three questions emerge. Will the reform
of the international tax system move in the direction
of a territorial system or toward making the world-
wide system more effective? If the former, what will
the system look like? What will be the revenue
consequences to the multinational sector of any
changes?
The first question can’t be answered now. The
administration’s proposals explicitly reject a territo-
rial system. Moreover, they would extract revenue
from the multinational sector to finance the corpo-
rate rate reduction. Most multinationals would find
that that alternative would increase their effective
tax rate.
Assuming a territorial system, there are a series
of design issues that have serious consequences.
The first is the scope of the income that will be
subject to the system. Both the Camp and Enzi
proposals (as well as all territorial systems adopted
around the world) limit the system to income
attributable to active business. One important
threshold question then is the definition of active
business. Conversely, the benefit of the system is
not available for passive income. The questions here
involve the definition of passive income and how
that income will be taxed in the United States — for
example, currently or when repatriated. Both Camp
and Enzi would treat passive income as currently
taxable in the United States. All other territorial
systems have some form of base erosion protection,
and the question is what the United States will
adopt. The Camp and Enzi proposals contain sev-
eral options, the consequences of which have to be
analyzed by each multinational company.
The revenue consequences to the international
sector obviously will depend on the structure of the
system that is adopted. The administration’s pro-
posal will increase the tax burden of that sector. In
contrast, both the Camp and Enzi proposals are
intended to be revenue neutral to the international
sector. That means that there will be winners and
losers within that sector, which may well affect the
enthusiasm with which particular companies em-
brace the proposal.
Apart from, but related to, the design of the
territorial system is the question of how to treat the
$1.4 trillion of currently unrepatriated corporate
offshore earnings. Major U.S. multinationals
formed the WIN America Campaign to lobby for a
second tax holiday for those earnings. They seek a
repeat of the 2004 Homeland Investment Act, under
which unrepatriated earnings could be returned to
the United States at a 5 percent tax rate. To date,
their efforts have not been successful. The JCT has
estimated that the provision would lose $78.7 bil-
lion over 10 years.66 Camp and Geithner have both
indicated that consideration of that proposal should
be in the context of overall business tax reform.67
Camp’s proposal contains a mandatory 5 percent
tax on all unrepatriated earnings, with an opportu-
nity to defer payment over eight years with an
interest charge. Enzi’s bill contains a similar provi-
sion. However, his provision is elective, with an
applicable tax rate on the repatriated earnings of
10.5 percent. It is unlikely that the issue will be
addressed independently of overall business tax
reform.
2. Domestic versus multinational companies.
Many domestic corporations, particularly in the
retail and service industries, have federal effective
tax rates that are at or near the statutory 35 percent
rate. Many multinationals, particularly those in the
pharmaceutical and high-tech industries, have ef-
fective rates in the mid- to low 20s.68 Obviously,
revenue-neutral reform will affect those sectors
differently, and the extent to which that will occur
depends on how the rate reduction will be financed.
For example, repeal of the section 199 deduction or
failure to extend the research credit will not affect
service or retail companies. Those sectors will be in
favor of any rate reduction financed by those
sources. Multinational companies will want to
avoid having their preferences reduced to pay for
domestic rate reduction. As a general proposition, a
65See the framework, supra note 38, at 5.
66JCT, Letter to Rep. Lloyd Doggett, D-Texas, Apr. 15, 2011,
Doc 2011-10226, 2011 TNT 55-30.
67See, e.g., Ferguson et al., ‘‘Geithner Says No Corporate Tax
Reform, Repatriation in FY 2012 Budget,’’ BNA (Feb. 10, 2011);
Blake Rubin, ‘‘Cash Hoard Grows by Untaxed Overseas Prof-
its,’’ Bloomberg, Mar. 2, 2012.
68See, e.g., testimony of Martin A. Sullivan before the Ways
and Means Committee, Jan. 20, 2011, Doc 2011-1281, 2011 TNT
14-44.
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revenue-neutral reduction of the corporate rate to
28 percent will benefit domestic entities and harm
many multinationals.
3. Domestic manufacturers versus other domestic
corporations. Again the question will be which
preferences finance the rate reduction and whether
benefit of the rate reduction exceeds the tax cost of
the preference repeal. For example, manufacturers
will focus on the fate of the section 199 manufac-
turing deduction. Capital-intensive industries will
focus on the implication of potential alterations of
the capital cost recovery system. Similarly, research-
heavy companies will pay attention to the fate of
the R&E credit. Those with LIFO inventory will
worry about the consequences of repeal. Again, the
preferences selected to finance the rate reduction
will affect companies differently.
4. Passthrough entities versus C corporations. Per-
haps the most difficult issue is to ensure that the
changes do not unduly affect the tax burden of the
passthrough sector. As previously discussed, that is
a serious structural, administrative, and political
issue, which has no good practical solution short of
integration. The existence of the problem has the
potential to pit the owners of passthrough entities
against the corporate community.
E. Wealth Transfer Tax
One of the most baffling aspects of the reform
debate has to do with the wealth transfer taxes. At
a $3.5 million exemption level, the tax will affect
less than 0.3 percent of individuals dying each
year.69 However, the revenue associated with the
tax is not insignificant. At that level and with a
maximum rate of 45 percent, the tax is estimated to
raise roughly $16 billion in 2013, rising to $29 billion
in 2019.70
Apart from revenue, there is an important policy
role for a tax on wealth transfers in our tax system.
Capital income is relatively lightly taxed by the
income tax and the appreciation in assets held at
death is forgiven by the rules that give an heir a
basis equal to date of death value. The wealth
transfer tax acts as a rough remedy to ensure that
some tax is paid by those owning appreciated
property.71 There would be no tax policy need for
the tax if death were treated as an income tax
realization event. Sensible rules can be devised to
deal with illiquid assets.
VI. The Practical Constraints
There are two principal practical constraints as-
sociated with reform legislation: legislative pro-
cedural rules and the lack of executive leadership.
A. Procedural Rules
Congressional consideration of tax legislation is
governed by several procedural rules that have the
potential to materially affect the outcome. The most
obvious is the Senate filibuster, which can be over-
come only by 60 votes to invoke cloture. Also,
special rules created by the Budget Enforcement Act
apply to tax legislation in both chambers.72
The procedural impediments in the Senate can be
overcome using reconciliation. If Congress adopts a
budget resolution that contains reconciliation in-
structions, the legislation that implements that
budget resolution is procedurally protected. The
implementing legislation is subject to a time limit
on debate and consequently cannot be filibustered.
Amendments must be germane. And most signifi-
cantly, if the reconciliation instructions authorize
revenue-losing legislation, the legislation is not
subject to a Budget Act point of order as long as the
authorized revenue loss is not exceeded.
For the current Congress, the importance of those
procedural rules cannot be overemphasized. First,
Congress will not pass a budget resolution this
session. While not a law (that is, the president does
not sign it), the resolution must be agreed on by
both chambers, and that simply will not happen.
The upshot is that the normal procedural rules
apply. Because neither party has 60 votes in the
Senate, it is unlikely that any significant changes
can be adopted. Second, the November election
outcome will affect lame-duck consideration of leg-
islation. For example, if either party secures a
majority in both chambers, a budget resolution in
the next Congress becomes more possible. The
content of that budget resolution would, of course,
depend on which party is in control. But the agenda
of that party could conceivably pass Congress using
reconciliation. The ultimate enactment of that legis-
lation would depend on who is president. If the
president is of a different party, the possibility of a
veto would always remain. Alternatively, the elec-
tion could result in each chamber controlled by a
different party, in which case agreement in the next
Congress would remain conjectural. None of those
post-election scenarios suggests that a lame-duck
session will do any more than attempt to resolve the
69Tax Policy Center, ‘‘Estate Tax Returns and Liability Under
Current Law and Various Reform Proposals, 2009-2019,’’ T09-
0431 (Oct. 30, 2009), Doc 2009-24094, 2009 TNT 210-30.
70Roberton Williams, ‘‘Where, Oh Where, Has the Estate Tax
Gone?’’ Tax Notes, Dec. 21, 2009, p. 1353.
71See Harry L. Gutman, ‘‘Reforming Federal Wealth Transfer
Taxes After ERTA,’’ 69 U. Va. L. Rev. 1183, 1187-1197 (1983).
72Under the Budget Act a point of order lies against tax
legislation that is not revenue neutral when measured in specific
time periods. It requires 60 votes to waive the point of order in
the Senate.
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impending expiration of the Bush tax cuts or the tax
provisions that expired at the end of 2011.
The revenue neutrality threshold and the
revenue-estimating process are also a source of
confusion and contention. The JCT provides the
revenue estimates that bind Congress. An estimate
is determined by assessing the revenue conse-
quences of any change in the tax law in comparison
to current law. The method involves a static esti-
mate of the revenue change as well as an adjust-
ment to take into account anticipated taxpayer
behavior.73 The macroeconomic effects on the
economy and the potential revenue consequences
of those effects are not taken into account. The latter
is often referred to as dynamic revenue scoring.
Dynamic revenue scoring has been a hot debat-
ing point for many years.74 While most tax law
changes are too insignificant to affect the macro-
economy, major changes might not be. For example,
some assert that the positive economic effects of a
major income tax rate reduction will produce eco-
nomic growth (and consequent tax revenue) suffi-
cient to offset the static tax loss of the rate reduction.
That assertion is nonsense. While tax changes can
stimulate the economy, the most aggressive esti-
mates have found that no more than a fraction of
the tax loss will be recaptured through growth over
the long term.75
There is no question that an estimate would be
more accurate if the macroeconomic effects were
taken into account. The principal reason that is not
done is a lack of agreement on the method to apply
to yield the precise numbers that are required by the
Budget Act.76 However, the JCT occasionally dis-
cusses the anticipated macroeconomic effect of tax
law changes by indicating a range of possible
outcomes.77
B. Executive Leadership
Many have commented that the goal of tax
reform should be to replicate the results of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, in which the individual and
corporate tax rates were reduced, there was no rate
difference between capital and wage income, and
the corporate tax base was broadened. That goal is
laudable, but this is not 1986 — it is more like 1984.
TRA 1986 was preceded by two comprehensive
Treasury studies.78 Extensive hearings were held.
The effort was led by President Reagan; Sens. Dole,
Packwood, and Bradley; and Ways and Means
Committee Chair Dan Rostenkowski.
Except for a series of hearings, nothing compa-
rable has happened today. There have been no
detailed Treasury studies or proposals. The presi-
dent has not made any significant commitment to
tax reform. Congress is fractured. There is no easy
available revenue source.
History informs that major tax changes cannot
occur without executive branch leadership. Even
then the task is difficult; without it, the effort is
unlikely to get off the ground.
C. Timing of Congressional Consideration
Legislation to avoid the fiscal cliff is not likely to
be enacted before the election — although there will
be plenty of posturing and empty threats. And all
the oxygen of the lame-duck session will be spent
avoiding going over that cliff. That is when Con-
gress will have to address the expiration of the Bush
tax cuts, the other expiring provisions, the seques-
tration mandated by the Budget Control Act, and
possibly a debt ceiling increase. There will not be
time to address the business tax.
73JCT, ‘‘Overview of Revenue Estimating Procedures and
Methodologies Used by the Staff of the Joint Committee on
Taxation,’’ JCX-1-05 (Feb. 2, 2005), Doc 2005-2081, 2005 TNT 22-9.
74See generally Buckley, ‘‘Dynamic Scoring: Will S&P Have
Company?’’ Tax Notes, Feb. 27, 2012, p. 1141, Doc 2012-1844, or
2012 TNT 39-7.
75See, e.g., Greg Mankiw and Matthew Weinzierl, ‘‘Dynamic
Scoring: A Back of the Envelope Guide,’’ National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper 11000 (Dec. 2004).
76See JCT, ‘‘Joint Committee on Taxation Tax Modeling
Project and 1997 Symposium Papers,’’ JCS-21-97 (Nov. 20, 1997),
Doc 97-31765, 97 TNT 225-13.
77See JCT, ‘‘Overview of the Work of the Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation to Model the Macroeconomic Effects of
Proposed Tax Legislation to Comply With House Rule
XIII.3(h)(2),’’ JCX-105-03 (Dec. 22, 2003), Doc 2003-26926, 2003
TNT 246-8.
78Treasury, ‘‘Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity and Eco-
nomic Growth’’ (Nov. 1984); Treasury, ‘‘The President’s Tax
Proposals to the Congress Tax Fairness, Growth and Simplicity’’
(May 1985).
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